

# Objective Bayesian epistemology and inductive logic

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My talk compares two ways of linking objective Bayesian epistemology and inductive logic. The first way, which I call the ‘framework approach’, interprets objective Bayesian epistemology as a framework for formalising inductive assumptions, much like Carnap’s inductive logic programme. The second ‘assumption approach’ takes the rational norms that characterise objective Bayesian epistemology as inductive assumptions and investigates them within Carnapian inductive logic.

Both approaches, I claim, do justice to the views of self-avowed objective Bayesian epistemologists, while also capturing those of the scientists whose work inspired the programme. However, each faces serious challenges. In order to capture the wide variety of rational inductive assumptions without contravening the norms of objective Bayesianism, the framework approach must construe all such assumptions as cases of differing evidence. The assumption approach, in turn, must reconcile objective Bayesianism’s conception of taking evidence into account by amending a set of not-ruled-out probability functions, with the conditional probability conception, which is central to Carnapian inductive logic.

I argue that, while neither of these challenges is insuperable in principle, the second approach seems more promising.